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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a pioneering paper, Debreu [4] extended the second fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics to economics with a topological vector space 
of commodities. Specifically, he showed that corresponding to a given 
Pareto optimal allocation of such an economy, there exists a price system 
at which the given allocation can be sustained as a valuation equilibrium. 
Debreu formalized the notion of a price system as a non-zero element of 
the topological dual of the commodity space and assumed, in particular, 
that the aggregate production set of the economy has a nonempty interior. 
Under this assumption and given convexity, Debreu could prove his result 
as a consequence of the supporting hyperplane theorem. 
Recent work in mathematical economics (see Mas-Cole11 [ 111 and the 
references therein) has questioned Debreu’s justification of the interiority 
assumption. This work has emphasized the importance of several spaces, 
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none of which has a positive cone with a nonempty interior. Thus, the 
economic assumptions of “free disposal” or “monotonic preferences” do not 
lead, as in the case of [4] or in the subsequent work of Bewley [2], to a 
set which has a nonempty interior and which needs to be supported. 
Indeed, it now appears that from the point of view of economic theory, R” 
and L, may be the only interesting spaces for which this is true. Further- 
more, we now have simple examples of economies for which Debreu’s 
theorem does not hold; see Jones [S] and also [ 111. 
Thus, there are two natural directions in which one can proceed. The 
first is to look for additional conditions on the underlying parameters of 
the economy under which Debreu’s theorem can be proved. This is the 
approach of Mas-Cole11 [ll, 121 and of subsequent work that utilizes his 
concept of “proper preferences.” Alternatively, one can look for satisfactory 
approximate versions of Debreu’s result as is done in [9] and in another 
context by Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw [l]. This is the direction 
that we pursue in this paper, although we also present a suflicient 
condition on an individual production set under which we obtain an exact 
result. 
Our work uses in an essential way recent results in functional analysis. 
For our approximate results, the basic idea is to find an “approximate” 
support to the closure of a convex set with an empty interior. This then 
leads to the question of finding sufficient conditions that are attractive in 
terms of economic theory and under which the sum of closed convex sets is 
closed. We present two such conditions. The first is due to the collective 
efforts of Choquet [3], Dieudonne [6], and Ky Fan [7] and it allows us 
to set our results in real, Hausdorff locally convex spaces. The second 
condition leads us to restrict the commodity space to those spaces which 
are strictly hypercomplete [15, Sects. 12-2 and 12-31. Our exact result, 
perhaps not surprisingly for functional analysts, draws on the 
BishopPhelps theorem, specifically a result [ 133 whose importance for 
economic theory was first seen by Majumdar [lo]. More generally, 
however, our results bring out the relevance of functional analytic methods 
for a rather basic problem in mathematical economics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and 
results and Section 3 the proofs. 
2. THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
For the basic terminology and notation we follow Wilansky [ 151. 
However, for ease of exposition we recall some basic concepts for the 
reader. 
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Let [E, F, o] be a dual pair, i.e., E, F are vector spaces over the reals and 
u is a bilinear functional on E x F and written v(x, y) = [x, y] and such 
that 
(a) [x, y] = 0 for all y in F implies x = 0 and 
(b) [x, y] = 0 for all x in E implies y = 0. 
In what follows, E will be given the interpretation of a commodity space, 
F that of a price space and u a valuation functional. Thus [x, y] denotes 
the value of a commodity bundle x in E at the price y in F. 
As is customary, we shall abbreviate a dual pair to be [E, F] and 
assume that some bilinear functional is specified. In the special case that 
Fc E*, where E* is the algebraic dual of E, the bilinear functional is given 
by (x, y ) = y(x) for any x in E and for any y in F. 
For any dual pair [E, F], a Hausdorff locally convex topology T on E 
(resp. F) is said to be compatible with the dual pair if the topological dual 
of E, E’ (resp. F), is F (resp. E). 
We shall respectively denote the weak, strong, and Mackey topologies, 
say, on E as a(& F), p(E, F), and z(E, F). We shall refer to the topology 
a(E’, E) as the weak* topology and to &E’, E) as the strong* topology. 
Thus, for example, a weak* closed subset of E’ should be taken to mean a 
a(E’, E)-closed subset of E’. 
When we refer to a set satisfying a particular topological property 
without specifying the topology, it is to be understood that the said 
property holds in any compatible topology. In our view, it is one of the 
advantages of our approach that we can state the assumptions underlying 
our results in any compatible topology. 
In the sequel we shall assume that E is a partially ordered vector space 
and F is endowed with an ordering induced by that on E. Given the recent 
work of Aliprantis et al. [l], it may be worth mentioning that neither E 
nor F is assumed to be a lattice. 
We now turn to our basic economic concepts. 
DEFINITION 1. An economy & is given by ( [E, F], 2, (X(t), 2 ,, 
e(t)),, Tj ( Y(j) ), E p 1 where 
(i) [E, F] is a dual pair with (E, > ) a partially ordered vector 
space, 
(ii) T is a finite set of consumers such that for each consumer t, 
X(t)cE, 2, is a binary relation on X(t)xX(t) and e(t)EX(t), 
(iii) P is a finite set of producers such that for each producer j, 
Y(j) c E. 
For any set S of positive integers, let (SI denote the cardinality of S. 
640’52’2.3 
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DEFINITION 2. An allocation (x, y)= {(x(t)),,., (~(j))~,~} of 8 is a 
(( Tj + IPJ )-tuple such that 
(i) x(t)EX(t) for all t in T, 
(ii) y(j)E Y(j) for alljEP, 
(iii) C,,, x(t) = IL, p YW + C,, T 4th 
DEFINITION 3. An allocation (x, y) of ~8’ is said to be Pareto Optimal if 
there does not exist any other allocation (x’, v’) such that for all t in T, 
x’(t) 2, x(t) and for at least one t, x’(t) >, x(t), where a >, b means a z2, b 
and not b 2, u. 
Without any confusion, we denote the induced ordering on F also by 3. 
For any p, q in F, let p > q denote (p - q) Z 0 and (p-q) # 0. Let N(E) 
(resp. N(F)) denote the set of neighborhoods of zero in E (resp. F). 
DEFINITION 4. For any real number 6 > 0 and any z E E-l{ 0 }, a (6, z)- 
approximate valuation equilibrium of & consists of a pair (p, (x, y)) such 
that 
(i) p~F,p>Oand [z,p]=-1. 
(ii) (x, y) is an allocation of 6 such that 
(a) 12, x(t) implies [z, p] 3 [x(t), p] -6 for all t in T, 
(b) ZE Y(j) implies [z, p] d [y(j), p] +6 for allj in P. 
Thus, an approximate valuation equilibrium consists of a price system 
and an allocation such that 
(i) each consumer is approximately minimizing expenditures and 
(ii) each produces is approximately maximizing his profits. 
In each case, the degree of approximation is measured by 6 and z, the latter 
controlling for the fact the price system is not normalized to render this 
approximation trivial. If x, E T e(t) E E+/(O), by letting z = -C,, .e(t), we 
can consider approximate valuation equilibria with the normalization 
CC ,,,e(tL PI = 1. 
Our final concept relates to an economy modelled on the dual pair 
(L’, L”) where L is a Banach space. 
DEFINITION 5. A valuation equilibrium of d is a pair (p, (x, y)) such 
that 
(i) PEL”, P>O, llpll = 1. 
(ii) (x, y) is an allocation of d such that 
(a) 22, x(t) implies (z, p) 2 (x(t), p) for all t in T. 
(b) ZE Y(j) implies (z, p) < (y(j), p) for allj in P. 
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It should be noted that the only difference between our definition of a 
valuation equilibrium and Debreu’s definition in [4] is that we require 
expenditure minimization rather than preference maximization. Conditions 
under which the former implies the latter are well known. It should also be 
noted that the price system in Definition 5 is required to be in the 
topological dual and that it may be desirable to find conditions which 
ensure that it lies in the predual. To anticipate somewhat, in our 
approximate result (Theorem 3) we do indeed find p in L, although our 
exact result (Theorem 4) requires p to be in L”. 
For our results we shall need the following assumptions on the economy 
& = 1 c-6 Fl> 3 1 (at), 2,, e(f)),, 7-Y (Y(j)),,,}. For any closed, convex 
subset K of E, .4(K) denotes the asymptotic cone of K and, following [3], 
is given by nA,O A( K - x), where x is any particular point in K. Let E, = 
fx~E:x>O) and E_ = -E+. 
(Al) (a) For all t in T, X(t) is a closed convex subset of E. 
(b) There exists convex Kc E such that for all f in T, 
X(t) c K and K has a lower bound for >, . 
(A2) For all t in T, for any y in X(t), the set R,(y) = {x E X(t): 
x 2, y } is closed, convex, and contains y. 
(A3) (a) For all j in P, Y(j) is a closed, convex subset of E. 
(b) For all j in P, OeY(j) and (E_)cY, Pn(-P)=(O), 
where Y=c,EP Y(j) and 7 denotes the closure of Y. 
(A4) There exists a z in T such that for any x, y, and z in X(z), 
x>y, y>,z=x>,z. 
It is worth emphasizing that we do not assume that 2, is either complete 
or transitive. 
For our first result, we shall need the following conditions in which for 
anyAcE,A’={pEF: [x,p]<l forallxEA}. 
CHOQUET CONDITION. The set Kin (Al)(b) and Y are a(E, F)-complete. 
For our next condition, we shall adopt the convention throughout this 
paper that locally compact will refer to the a(E, $)-topology. 
DIEIJDONN~ CONDITION. The set K in (Al )(b) and Y are locally 
compact. 
We can now state 
THEOREM 1. Zf d satisfies (Alt(A4) and if either the Choquet or the 
DieudonnP Condition is fulfilled, then for any 6 > 0, z E E- /{ 0) and for any 
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Pareto optimal allocation (x*, y*) of 8, there exists p* G F, such that 
(p*, (x*, y*)) is a (6, z)-approximate valuation equilibrium of &. 
COROLLARY 1. Theorem 1 is valid if either the Choquet or the Dieudonne 
Condition is replaced by the requirement that the z(F, E)-interiors qf K” and 
Y” are nonempty. 
The corollary makes clear the fact that the hypotheses relating to K are 
no restriction for an economy modelled on the dual pair [L’, L], L a 
Banach space such that L, has a nonempty norm interior. The hypotheses 
relating to Y are, however, a restriction even in these circumstances and 
our next two results attempt to cope with this by restricting the class of 
locally convex spaces. They also require the following conditions on X(t), 
Y(j) and on the mutual position of the sum of these sets. 
DIEUDONN~ CONDITION II. (i) There exists r~ in T such that Cl+ 2 X(t) 
is locally compact. 
(ii) There existsfE P such that xi+, Y(j) is locally compact. 
CONDITION A. For any p(E, F)-bounded set B, (C,, TX(t)) n 
(c,, p Y(j) + B) is /I(,!?, F)-bounded. 
We can now state 
THEOREM 2. Let 8 satisfy (Al )-(A4), Condition A and the Dieudonne 
Condition II. If /3( E, F)-sequentially closed convex sets are p( E, F)-closed 
and [F, E] is a quasibarrelled ual pair, then the conclusion of Theorem 1 
holds. 
Our final result of this genre substitutes the following condition for the 
Dieudonne Condition II and, in so doing, allows us to drop (Al)(b) and 
(A3)(b). 
KY FAN CONDITION. (i) For any Pareto optimal allocation (x, y), 
(R,(x(t)))‘n (z(F, E)-interior (Cf:: &(x(i)))‘) # 0, t = 2, . . . . I TI. 
(ii) (Y(i))‘n (z(F, E)-interior (C~:I i Y(j))“) # 0, i= 2, . . . . IPJ. 
We can now state 
COROLLARY 2. Theorem 2 is valid without and (A3)(b) if the Ky 
Fan Condition is substituted for the DieudonnP Condition II. 
For our next result we model our economy d on the dual pair [L’, L], 
where L is a real, locally convex Hausdorff space and L’+ is a normal cone 
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for fl(L’, L), (see [14, p. 2151 for a definition). Moreover, we shall need to 
substitute (A3’) for (A3), where 
(A3’) Y is a closed, convex subset of L’. 
We shall also need 
CONDITION B. For any Ii E N(L), (X7,,, X(t)) n ((CrET e(t) + 
C,t p Y(j)) + U’) is strong* bounded. 
We can now state 
THEOREM 3. Let 8 satisfy (Al ), (A2), (A3’), and (A4). u, in addition, 8 
satisfies Condition B and L is strictly hypercomplete and quasibarrelled, then 
the conclusion of Theorem 1 ho& 
It is well known that a strictly hypercomplete quasibarrelled space is 
barrelled; see, for example, [ 15, Theorem 12-4-3 and Remark lo-4- 133. We 
do not know if Theorem 3 is true for barrelled spaces. 
Our final result presents a sufficient condition under which Pareto 
optimal allocations can be exactly decentralized. This sufficient condition 
formalizes the requirement of uniformly bounded marginal rates of sub- 
stitution of any one production set. We consider an economy 8 modelled 
on the dual pair (L’, L”). 
CONDITION M. There exists f’ in P and there exists p E L”, p > 0 such 
that any supporting hyperplane with unit norm, p E L”, IlpIl = 1, to the set 
Y(f) satisfies p 3 j?. 
Condition M is an assumption on the parameters of an individual agent 
and does not assert that a supporting hyperplane necessarily exists at a 
particular boundary point of Y(f). 
THEOREM 4. Let 8 be modelled on (L’, L”) with L a Banach space und 
let d satisfy (Al), (A2), (A3’), (A4), and ConditionsB and M. Then 
corresponding to any Pareto optimal allocation (x*, y*) of B, there exists 
p* EL such that (p*, (x*, y*)) is a valuation equilibrium of 8. 
Remark 2. Note that Theorem 4 has nothing to say about an exchange 
economy, i.e., one, where Y(j) = (0 > for all j. 
Remark 3. We have presented our exact result in the context of the 
setting of Theorem 4. It should be clear from an inspection of the proofs 
that we could equally well have presented it under the setting of our other 
approximate results, i.e., with the Choquet or the Dieudonne conditions 
instead of Condition B. 
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3. PROOFS 
We begin with the following elementary result. 
LEMMA. Let Z, and Z2 be two subsets of E. Then 
(a) for any real number A# 0, A(Z, n Z,) = iZ, n AZ,; 
(b) foranyzin E, (Z,nZ,)-(z)=(Z,-z)n(Z,-z); 
(c) if Z, and Z, are closed convex and such that Z, A Z2 #O, 
A(Z,nZ,)=A(Z,)nA(Z,). 
Proof of the Lemma. We begin with (a). For any z in 1(Z, n Z,), there 
exists k in Z, n Z, such that z = Ak which implies z is in (AZ, n AZ,). On 
the other hand, if z is in AZ, n LZ,, there exist zi E Zi such that z = ,Iz, = 
lz,. Since /z # 0, zr = z2 and hence z E I(Z, n Z,). 
As regards (b), k E (Z, n Z,) - (z) if and only if (k + z) E Z, (i = 1,2), if 
and onlyifkEZi-z (i=l,2), that is ke(Z,-z)n(Z,-z). 
Let keZ,nZ,. Then by (a) and (b), z~[n,,,~(Z,-k)]n[n;,, 
l.(Z,--k)] if and only if zE [n,,,A((Z,nZ,)-k)]. 1 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (x*, y*) be a Pareto optimal allocation of d 
and let 
w= c &(x*(t))- c w- c x*(t) + 1 Y*(A> 
rer IEP IET jcP 
where R,(x*(t)) is as defined in (A2). 
The essential part of the proof is to show that W is a closed set in E. We 
begin with the case when the Choquet Condition holds. Since K is bounded 
from below for 2, there exists b E E such that K- b is a subset of E, . By 
the Choquet Condition, K- b is a a(E, P)-complete subset of E. Since E is 
an ordered vector space, E, contains no straight line. By (A2), R,(x*(t)) is 
closed, convex for all t in T. We can now appeal to Choquet’s theorem [3] 
to assert that C, E T R,(x*(t)) is closed. Next we show that 7 contains no 
straight line. Suppose it did, i.e., there exist x, y in E, x # y such that 
2x+(1-i)y is in P for all real numbers ,I. This implies 
(1 - ;l)(y - x) E A( 9) for all 2. On choosing 1% =0 and ;1= 2, we can con- 
cludethat (y-x)isinA(P)andin -A(P)=A(--P). Onusing(c)ofthe 
lemma, we contradict the fact that Yn (- F) = (0). Hence by a second 
appeal to Choquet’s theorem, we can assert that xjEP Y(j) is closed. For 
the final step, observe that (A3)(b) implies that E, c - Y. Since 
(K-b)cE+, Kcb- Y. Since CtaT R,(x*(t)) is contained in K, we can 
assert that the set (b - Y) contains I,, T R,(x*(t)). Since Y is a(E, F)-com- 
plete by the Choquet condition, so is b- Y. We can now make a third 
appeal to Choquet’s theorem to assert that x,, *Rl(x*(t))- Y + b is 
closed. This implies that W is closed and completes the proof of our claim. 
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Next, we turn to the case when the Dieudonne Condition holds. Since 
&(x*(t)) are closed subsets of a locally compact set, they are locally com- 
pact. Since &(x*(t)) are subsets of K and K is bounded from below for 3, 
there exists b E E such that R,(x*(t)) - b c E, for all t in T. Since 
&(x*(t)) - b is closed and convex, we can take its asymptotic cone. Since 
E, n E- = {0}, A(R,(x*(t)) nA( -R,(x*(s))= (0) for any t, s in T. We 
can now appeal to Dieudonne’s theorem [6] to assert that &(x*(t)) + 
R,(x*(s)) is closed for any t, s in T. The same argument can be repeated for 
a given R,(x*(u)) and R,(x*(t))+R,(x*(s)). Proceeding in this way, we 
can show that C,, T R,(x*(t)) is closed. 
Since Y(j) c Y, Y(j) is closed, and Y is locally compact, Y(j) is locally 
compact for j E P. Furthermore Y(i) n ( - Y(j)) = (0) for all i # j in 
P as a consequence of Pn ( - F) = { 0 $. Hence, by a second appeal to 
Dieudonntt’s theorem, we can assert that Y(i) + Y(j) is closed. By 
repeating this argument for another Y(k), we can show that C,, p Y(j) is 
closed. 
Next, we assert that Yn E, = (0). If not, there exists y in Y, JJ E E, and 
such that y #O. By (A3)(b), -y E Y. This implies y E (- Y) and we con- 
tradict the fact that Fn ( - y) = (0). Since K - b c E, , so is its closure 
i?- b. This implies that Yn (K- 6) = (0) which implies that 
A(Y) n A(R) = (0). Since A(C,, T R,(x*(t))) c A(@, and Y is locally 
compact, a final appeal to Dieudonne’s theorem completes the proof of our 
claim that W is closed. 
Next, we claim that Wn E- = (0). This is a simple consequence of (A4) 
and the fact that (x*, y*) is a Pareto optimal allocation of 8. 
By (A2) and (A3), W is a nonempty, convex set. Given any ZE Ed-/{O}, 
we can apply the second separation theorem [ 13, 11.9.21 to assert the 
existence of p E F, p # 0 such that 
cw, PI ’ Ch PI for all MI E W. (1) 
Since OE W, [Sz, p] ~0. Now let p* = -6p/[6z, p] so that p*z= - 1. 
Then we can rewrite (1) as 
cw, p*1> -6 for all MJE W. (2) 
Now for any t in T, and any x in R,(x*(t)), let v = (x-x*(t)). Certainly 
v E W, and hence 
cx, P*l > [x*(t), P*l - 6. (3) 
Similarly, for any jE P, and any y E Y(j), u = ( - y + y*(j)) is an element of 
W. This yields 
CY, P*l < b*(j), P*I + 6. (4) 
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Finally, we show that p* > 0. Suppose there exists u in E, such that 
(u, p*) < 0. By (A4), (X*(T) + kt;)~R,(x*(r)) for any positive integer k. 
This implies k[v, p*] > -6 for any k, an obvious contradiction. 1 
Proqf of Corollary 1. Since Ky Fan’s Theorem 1 [7] shows that non- 
empty r(F, E)-interiority of !?I implies that K is a(E, F)-complete and 
locally compact, assuming the former property for K and Y requires no 
changes in the proof. 1 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let W be defined exactly as in the proof of 
Theorem 1. Our first claim is that W is /3($ F)-closed. Since W is convex, 
we need only show that W is /l(E, F)-sequentially closed. Towards this end, 
choose a sequence {M”‘} from W such that the p(E, F)-limit of IV” is by. We 
have to show U’E W. Since M’~ E W, there exist X”(I)E R,(x*(t)), JJ”(~)E Y(j) 
such that 
,& (Y(t) - x*(t)) - c (y”(j) - y*(j)) = H”‘. (5) IEP 
Since {w”} is a /l(E, F)-bounded set, there exists a /I(,?, I;)-bounded set B 
such that 
ii+ + c x*(f) - 2 y*(j) 
! 
E B for all n. (6) 
rcr /tp 
This implies that 
We can now appeal to condition A to assert that (C, t r x”( t)} is a /3( E, F)- 
bounded set. Since F is quasibarrelled in any compatible topology, we can 
apply Cl.5, Theorem l&10-11] to assert that {C,Er~~“(t)) is r(F, E) 
equicontinuous and hence, by AlaogluBourbaki, a( E, F)-relatively com- 
pact. This implies that there exists a subnet {C,, 7‘ I”} of {C,, ,-9(t)) 
which converges in c(E, F) to a limit, say .?. It is clear from an inspection 
of the relevant arguments in the proof of Theorem 1, that our appeal to 
Diedonne’s theorem requires local compactness of all but one of R,(x*(t)). 
Hence, C, c 7 R,(x*(t)) is closed by Dieudonne Condition II(i). Hence 
.?CE~,, 7,R,(x*(t)). 
We can now rewrite (5) as 
,5p Y”(A = ,& (-et) --x*(f)) +c v*m + I#. 
jeP 
(8) 
On taking a(6 F)-limits of both sides and on observing that a(& F)-limit 
of {w”} is 111, we can show that C,, P $‘(j) also has a a(,!?, F)-limit, 
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say j. However, as in the proof of Theorem 1, a second application of 
Dieudonne’s theorem along with Dieudonne Condition II and (A3) 
yields the fact that CiEP Y(j) is closed. Hence there exist F(~)E Y(.j) 
such that xi, P L;(,j) = j. This implies 
IV =x- c j(j) - c x*(t) + c y*(j), (9) 
ic P /ST IEP 
and completes the proof of the assertion that EVE W. 
We can now follow the remaining steps in the proof of Theorem 1 to 
complete the proof of the theorem. 1 
Proqf of Corollary 2. Given Ky Fan Condition (i), we can make suc- 
cessive appeals to Theorem 1 in [7] to assert that x,, r- R,(.u*(r)) is closed. 
Also given Ky Fan Condition (ii), successive appeals to Theorem 1 in [7] 
allows us to conlude that Y is closed. We can now repeat the argument in 
the proof of Theorem 2 and conclude that XE~,, T R,(x*(r)) and 
C.~C,EP Y(j) without any appeal to Dieudonne Condition II. The remain- 
ing steps in the proof of Theorem 2 which call for the repetition of the 
corresponding steps in the proof of Theorem 1, remain unchanged. 1 
Proof’ of Tlworenz 3. Let W be defined exactly as in the proof of 
Theorem 1. Our first claim is that W is weak* closed. Since L is strictly 
hypercomplete, all we need to show is that W n U” is weak* closed for any 
UE N(L), [ 15, 12-3-7 and 12-2-31. Towards this end, pick any net (r~“) 
from Wn l? and such that the weak* limit of {M.‘} is r~. We have to show 
that 11’ E Wn U”. Since 1~” E W, there exist y”(t) E R,(.\-*(r)), it’ E Y(.j) 
such that 
1 x’(f)= w+ c y”(j) + 1 u*(z)- ,y J*(j). (10) 
IE I /tp It: I ,E I’ 
Since M!’ E U”, and since (x* , y*) is an allocation, we can appeal to 
Condition B to assert that {C,, T x”(t)) is strong* bounded. We can apply 
[15, Theorem IO-l-111 to assert that {CIET,y’(f)) is equicontinuous. By 
AlaogluBourbaki, this implies that there exists a weak* convergent subnet 
{C,,Txg’(r)}. Let th e weak* limit of this subnet be .U. 
Since {C,.+“(t)} is a strong* bounded set, so is {C,, TV?‘}. Further- 
more, since x”(t) E X(t), there exists h E E such that (x”(t) - h) 2 0 for all t 
in T and all p. Since L’+ is a normal cone, we can appeal to [ 14, 
Theorem 3.1, p. 2151 to assert that {x”(t)) is strong* bounded. Since L is 
quasibarrelled, by a second appeal to [ 15, Theorem lo-l- 111, we can 
assert that (x”(r)} is equicontinuous. By Alaoglu-Bourbaki, this implies 
that there exists a weak* convergent subnet, also denoted by {x”(t)}, 
which tends to a limit x’(r). Since (x”(t)} is a net from R,(x*(r)) and the 
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latter is a closed set, ~‘(t)~R,(x*(t)). By taking as many subnets as 
necessary, we can conclude that C,,T~‘(f) l x,,~R,(x*(t)) and that 
X=CrETX’(f). 
Now we can rewrite (10) as 
c y”(j) = -WC’ + 1 (x”(t) - x*(r)) + 1 y*(j). (11) 
IEP IS7 /tp 
Since the right-hand side tends to a weak* limit, the left-hand side tends to 
a weak* limit, say j. Since Cigp Y(j) is weak* closed by (A3’), it contains 
,V. This implies that 
w=x-y- c x*(r)+ c y*(j), 
1tT iEP 
(12) 
which in turn leads us to conclude that u’ E W n U”. 
We can now follow the remaining steps in the proof of Theorem 1 to 
complete the proof. i 
Proof of Theorem 4. Since L is strictly hypercomplete [ 15, 12-3-31, we 
can proceed just as in the proof of Theorem 4 to assert that W is weak* 
closed and that 0 is in the norm boundary of W. Since L is a Banach space, 
so is L’. If the convex set W can be supported at 0, the proof can be easily 
completed. If not, we can appeal to Phelps’ theorem [ 13, Theorem 1 ] to 
assert, for each E > 0, the existence of w,: E W, 11 u’,I/ < E, and p,: E L/(0} such 
that 
(w P,> 2 (fi’,, P,:) for all MJE W. (13) 
Since u’, E W, there exist x,(t) E R,(x*(t)) and y,(j) E Y(j) such that 
(u’, PC) 2 (,F$(f) - jFp Y,(j), PJ 
for all WE C R,(J*(f))-i~p Y,,). 
( 
(14) 
1ET 
Now consider the producer f described in Condition M and deduce from 
(14) by appropriate choice of w that 
(Z> P,> 6 (y,(f), P,> for all ZE Y(f). (15) 
This implies that pE supports Y(f) at y,(f). Without loss of generality we 
can assume IIpEI( = 1 and thus by Condition M, p, 2 p > 0. 
Since the above argument is true for all E > 0 and since pE has unit norm, 
{PEjE>O has a weak* convergent subnet with limit p*. As p, 2 p, p* # 0. 
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Furthermore, as E tends to zero, w,: tends to zero in norm. Thus, we can 
rewrite (13) as 
(w, p*jao for all w E W. (16) 
We can now normalize p* to have unit norm and also appeal to (A4) to 
show that p* E L’; . Finally, obvious computations complete the proof. a 
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